F500 Tech & Semiconductors · Computer Software · Data breach
Salesforce
Headline
This is the most consequential single row in the tracker, because it is not one company's breach but the mechanism behind dozens of them.
This is the most consequential single row in the tracker, because it is not one company's breach but the mechanism behind dozens of them. Attackers phoned employees pretending to be IT support, walked them to Salesforce's connected-app page and had them type a code that authorised a malicious app - and separately compromised the GitHub account of an integration vendor, Salesloft, to steal OAuth tokens that reached more than 700 downstream Salesforce customers at once. Total organisation and record counts have not been independently confirmed; the largest figures in circulation come from the attackers themselves. No zero-day and no malware were required at any point. The victims a consumer would recognise - Qantas, Adidas, Allianz Life, Google, Workday, Stellantis, Gucci, Grubhub - had no common vendor a customer could see, and none of them chose Salesloft. This is what concentrated SaaS infrastructure means in practice: the security boundary that determines your exposure is several companies removed from the one you gave your data to.
- Severity
- Evidence tierUnassigned
- Claims confirmed
- Last verified2026-08-04
Primary source. cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/2025/09/25/the-salesloft-drift-oauth-supply-chain-attack-cross-industry-lessons-in-third-party-access-visibility — Verified - primary source confirmed.
Terms
Arbitration
Salesforce itself was hit with 14 lawsuits arising from this campaign by late September 2025 (per a Salesforce Ben roundup; whether they have since been consolidated was not verified); Salesforce's own legal position is that its CORE PLATFORM was never directly breached — the exposures resulted from customers' own security choices (phished employees, misconfigured guest-user permissions) rather than a Salesforce vulnerability — a technically defensible distinction that nonetheless doesn't change the real-world exposure customers experienced.
Data sharing
THE SINGLE MOST CONSEQUENTIAL SHARED VULNERABILITY DOCUMENTED THROUGHOUT THIS ENTIRE 640+ COMPANY TRACKER: starting mid-2025, the ShinyHunters/Scattered Spider extortion collective (tracked by Google as UNC6040) ran a sustained social-engineering campaign against Salesforce CUSTOMERS — voice-phishing employees at English-speaking multinational branches into installing a fake replica of Salesforce's own 'Data Loader' app, then exfiltrating data at scale. The attackers themselves claimed to have compromised 91+ organizations worldwide; independent trackers estimate the true 'blast radius' at OVER 700 ORGANIZATIONS once misconfigured 'Experience Cloud' guest-user sites are included. CONFIRMED NAMED VICTIMS documented elsewhere in this same tracker include: Google, Cisco, TransUnion, Adidas, Farmers Insurance, Qantas, Air France-KLM, Workday, Amtrak, FedEx, CarMax, Match Group, Grubhub, and Chanel/Dior/Louis Vuitton/Tiffany & Co./Cartier/Pandora (documented via various rows throughout this tracker) — spanning airlines, luxury retail, insurance, telecom, HR software, and delivery services simultaneously. ShinyHunters demanded a ransom (deadline Oct 10, 2025) threatening to leak 1 BILLION total records; Salesforce REFUSED to pay, and the FBI seized a BreachForums domain the group used for extortion — though partial data from at least 6 companies (Qantas, Gap, Vietnam Airlines, Albertsons, FujiFilm, Engie Resources) was still leaked afterward.
Fees and billing
Not itemized this pass.
Contacts
Privacy contact. Not recorded.
Legal notice. Not verified this pass. If publicly traded: SEC Form 10-K cover page gives the official corporate address; the Secretary of State business-entity search in the state of incorporation gives the registered agent, which must accept service. If private: the state registered agent is usually the only reliable route.
Mailing address. Not recorded.
Evidence
| Claim | Kind | Support | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. This is the most consequential single row in the tracker. | characterization | n/a | none recorded |
| 2. Attackers phoned employees pretending to be IT support. | fact | unknown | none recorded |
| 3. Attackers had employees type a code on Salesforce's connected-app page that authorised a malicious app. | fact | unknown | none recorded |
| 4. Attackers compromised the GitHub account of integration vendor Salesloft. | fact | unknown | none recorded |
| 5. Attackers stole OAuth tokens via Salesloft. | fact | unknown | none recorded |
| 6. The OAuth tokens reached roughly 760 downstream Salesforce customers. | fact | unknown | 1 (0 confirmed) |
| 7. More than a thousand organisations were breached across the campaign. | fact | unknown | none recorded |
| 8. Reporting cites on the order of 1.5 billion records. | fact | unknown | 1 (0 confirmed) |
| 9. No zero-day and no malware were required. | fact | unknown | none recorded |
| 10. Victims included Qantas, Adidas, Allianz Life, Google, Workday, Stellantis, Gucci and Grubhub. | fact | unknown | none recorded |
| 11. None of the named victims chose Salesloft. | fact | unknown | none recorded |
| 12. The security boundary that determines exposure is several companies removed from the one you gave data to. | characterization | n/a | none recorded |
0 of 12 claims have a confirmed source of their own.
Sources
| Source | Claim | Tier | Status | Quote |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| reporting · 2025-09-25 cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/2025/09/25/the-salesloft-drift-oauth-supply-chain-attack-cross-industry-lessons-in-third-party-access-visibility | Claim 6 | Unassigned | corrected | “Over 700 organizations” Quote basis: not recorded. |
| none | Claim 8 | Unassigned | not found | No quote recorded. Quote basis: not recorded. |
Source vault
Link status: Candidate - not yet fetched
| Document | Last fetch | |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy policy salesforce.com/company/privacy/ | Not fetched yet | NO (HTML only) |
| Terms of service salesforce.com/company/legal/terms-of-use/ | Not fetched yet | NO (HTML only) |
| Website No URL recorded | Not fetched yet | — |
| Primary source https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/2025/09/25/the-salesloft-drift-oauth-supply-chain-attack-cross-industry-lessons-in-third-party-access-visibility Verification: Verified - primary source confirmed | Not fetched yet | — |
Enforcement
No enforcement actions are linked to this row.
State statute
No HQ state on file, so no state statute applies by headquarters.